**Lifanyuan’s Limits of Competence with Regard to Tibet**

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Not published yet !

**Did the Lifanyuan administer Tibetan affairs?**

From a brief presentation of the Qing government’s various policies applied to the different parts of its empire, Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, a preliminary conclusion would be to recognize the special treatment the Qing attributed to each of these three parts. Regarding Tibet, a few characteristics are obvious: the Qing managed Tibet according to three different ways because of its territorial and internal administrative organizations; Tibet was not conquered; no Tibetan military banner was created; Tibet was not subject to Han immigration; the Tibetan government was maintained in existence. As a matter of fact, the Beijing government adopted a special policy for Tibet that differed from practices in Mongolia and Xinjiang.

However, despite the set of differing policies, it is still considered that Tibetan affairs were managed by the Lifanyuan as were the Mongolian and Uighur communities. In my essay I will challenge this traditional wisdom by the analysis of documents exchanged between the governments in Lhasa and Beijing. Then, the Lifanyuan’s practical involvement within the administration of Tibet will be discussed through the reading of *The Imperially Commissioned Collected Regulations of the Qing Dynasty* and the accompanying *Imperially Commissioned Collected Regulations and Precedents of the Qing Dynasty*. Finally, the carriers of the Amban, who was the Qing imperial commissioner based in Lhasa, will serve as a key element to determine potential links between the Lifanyuan and these Manchu agents in Lhasa as they were the visible face of the Manchu administration in Tibet.

**Regional Divergences in the Making of Qing Imperial Administration**

The Qing government defined various policies towards Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet. In Mongolia, the Manchus reorganized the Mongol population in banners, leagues and aimags. Roughly speaking, they divided the Mongolian tribes, which traditionally had one chief, into several banners and every banner had its Manchu leader, a Jasak. Titles were granted to every Mongol leader. The creation of these banners followed the advance of the Manchu troops, and authorized the growing of the Qing military force. This was to become the military support of the Qing court and would allow the Qing to remain a dynasty of conquest from the mid-seventeenth to the beginning of the 20th century. Mongolia was not modified as a Chinese province.

Eastern Turkestan to the south and Zungharia to the north of the Tian Shan mountain range were conquered in the mid-eighteenth century and were administered by military governors (*jiangjun* 将军) and other high military officials (ma. *amban*; chin. *zhu zang dachen* 驻藏大臣) from 1762 who reported directly to the “Grand Council” (*junjichu* 军机处) in the capital. Routine affairs were handled by native officials known as *begs*. The area became a Chinese province under the name of Xinjiang in 1884.

Tibet had three provinces (Amdo, Khams and dBüs-gTsang). Amdo province, neighbouring China, became part of Gansu province in 1723 and was then administered by a Manchu civil official based in Xining. Parts of Khams were controlled by Sichuan provincial authorities and the *tusi* system was confirmed in some areas.[[1]](#footnote-1) Central Tibet (dBüs-gTsang) was not included into the Chinese provincial structure. As a matter of fact, this situation was considered as a *fait accompli* by the Qing authorities who concentrated their efforts towards Central Tibet by sending armies to defend Tibet when necessary and named an imperial commissioner (*amban*) to work in cooperation with the Tibetan authorities from the beginning of the 18th century. The Amban represented the secular arm of the emperor in Tibet and reported directly to him or to the “Grand Council” or to the “Grand Secretariat” (*neige* 内阁). This integration of the newly conquered territories into the empire was, however, not restricted by political and administrative reforms. Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet were also subject to tributes to the Qing court and to a religious policy that attempted to control first and to include second the religious authorities within the Manchu hierarchical pattern.

As to the origins of these policies, different developments and factors can be addressed. From a strategic point of view, in Mongolia the Manchus wanted to avoid the creation of a Mongol coalition which could threaten the empire’s security while in Xinjiang they aimed to overcome the power of the Western Mongols in Zungharia and of the Turkic Muslims in Eastern Turkestan. By using Tibetan Buddhism, the Manchus expected to better control the Mongol people, although Tibet, contrary to Mongolia and Xinjiang, was never conquered. It was only with the end of the 19th century that all three Tibetan provinces became a ‘buffer zone’ of overlapping international interests and a focal point of Inner China and the maintenance of the Qing Empire. Finally, the Manchu conquest of the Ming territories was achieved thanks to a multi-ethnic force composed of Manchus, Mongols and Chinese organized into banners. Tellingly, no Tibetan banner was created and only a few Tibetans were incorporated in the Mongol banners formed in Amdo.[[2]](#footnote-2)

Economic aspects and local conditions also played a role. While Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang were subjects to a scheduled Han population transfer in order to clear pasturages for cultivation, Tibet did not experience any kind of Han immigration. In Mongolia, the Beijing government considered reorganizing the Mongolian tribes into banners. In Xinjiang, the permanent wars were conceived as a threat to the empire and had to be ended. While neither Mongolia nor Xinjiang had their own central governments, the Tibetan government, based in Lhasa in Central Tibet and composed of civil and religious officials, was maintained.

Besides, the Qing emperorship showed its own peculiar characteristics. Today, it is widely assumed, though not sufficiently discussed, that the Qing emperors and especially Qianlong (r. 1736-1795) perceived themselves as the head of a multi-cultural empire that they incarnated. This universal power was based on the submission of different peoples, including the Han people, whose culture had to be kept alive and separate. The emperor thus symbolized not only the link between the five peoples of the empire (Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans, Uighurs and Chinese) but intended also to represent and incarnate every religion of his empire. That is why the emperor appeared as the protector of each of them, particularly of Tibetan Buddhism and the *dge-lugs-pa* school, the one the Dalai Lama lineage belongs to.[[3]](#footnote-3)

**Early Qing Chinese and Tibetan Relationships**

With regard to Tibet, the religious dimension was just as important as the secular dimension, considering the fact that the Dalai Lama was at the same time the spiritual and mundane ruler of this country. From a spiritual point of view, the priest-patron relationship created between Qubilai Khan (r. 1260-1294), the first Mongolian emperor of China, and ‘Phags-pa (\*1235 †1280) was in fact restored between the Dalai Lamas and the Manchu emperors by the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso (\*1617 †1682, r.1642-1682) and the Qing emperor Shunzhi (\*1638 †1661, r. 1644-1661). When the Tibetan hierarch went to Beijing in 1652 the Manchu emperor was a child, assisted by a group of Manchu and Chinese officials, and hence not able to make decisions on his own, which may have limited his position.

Within the framework of this personified relationship, the former delivered Buddhist teaching to the latter in exchange for protection, which could take the form of donations and military or administrative support. From a spiritual point of view, the Manchu emperor thus became the protector of the doctrine, the ideal universal monarch or *cakravartin*. However, because the emperor’s protection applied both to the person of the Dalai Lama and the *dge-lugs-pa* school, to which the Dalai Lama belonged, and the government that the Dalai Lama led, the relationship between him and the Manchu emperor remained ambiguous. The emperor acquired a role in Tibetan policies and the defence of Tibet through his Ambans in order to protect the masters and monasteries of the *dge-lugs-pa* school, while at the same time, from a more pragmatic point of view, he sought to guarantee the security of the southwest border of the Qing Empire and the Mongol frontier regions.

Each time a Dalai Lama established a priest-patron relationship with a Manchu emperor, he was, from a spiritual point of view, considered superior to the emperor by the Tibetan side and equal to the emperor by the Manchus. Qianlong, for example, considered himself to be the emanation of *Mañjuśrī*. However, from a mundane and Manchu perspective, the Dalai Lama was placed in a position of inferiority, as someone who needed to be conducted in his secular role. It would be interesting to understand how the Manchu emperor himself used the religious and secular aspects of the Tibetan leadership and government for his own advantage to exercise political supremacy over Tibet.

As we have seen, different administrative treatments and different geographical interpretations have been applied to Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, which was renamed and had its borders modified. The territories and borders of these Inner Asian areas, very much on the periphery of Central China, were geographically and administratively still badly understood and perceptions permanently changed during the Qing dynasty. Mongolia was divided between ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’, depending on the degree of proximity with the centre of the Manchu Empire and the period of the incorporation of various Mongol groups. Mongolian territories that were subdued by Manchu forces at an earlier point in time were called ‘Inner’, while others incorporated later were called ‘Outer’. The very same schedule of ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ was applied to define the proximity of Tibetan territories to the empire. Tibet was likewise subject to changing perceptions depending on the degree of Qing military intervention and the knowledge of the area collected by the Ambans. But the question of Tibetan statehood was, however, not resolved until the end of the Qing dynasty, not even during the Simla conference in 1913-1914, political particularism being one of its main obstacles. Even in Central Tibet, the local political and administrative control remained split. In theory, the entire area was subordinated to the Tibetan central government in Lhasa, but some areas, such as the domains of the *sa-skya* or the *bkra-shis-lhun-po* monasteries stayed autonomous. Amdo and Khams did not fall under the authority of the Tibetan central government either. The province of Amdo in North-East Tibet was autonomous from Lhasa even before it was brought under Qing authority in 1723, while Khams, on the border between China and Tibet, was divided into principalities whose chiefs tried to stay independent or attached themselves to Peking or Lhasa according to the circumstances.

The Manchus were, indeed, aware of the differences among the three main Tibetan provinces. This becomes obvious when we compare the Manchu administrative mode chosen for each of them: in Central Tibet, since the 18th century, we find a government where a Manchu or Mongolian Amban was appointed who would act as a kind of supervisor; in Amdo, an Amban was in charge of administrative life; and in Khams, the *tusi* system was implemented and some parts of it were incorporated into the Chinese provinces nearby (mainly Sichuan). Both ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ were, however, not well-defined and the borders between the two were still unspecified at the end of the dynasty.[[4]](#footnote-4) But despite obvious difficulties in defining the Tibetan inner territories, it would be interesting to follow the question as to when the Qing first considered Tibet (as they define it, i.e. without Amdo province) to become part of their maps (*ru* *ban tu* 入版图) and how they intended to control Tibet in comparison or in contrast to Mongolia and Xinjiang.

**Tibet under Qing Administration: Published and Archival Sources**

Interestingly, standard and recent literature still affirm that Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet were administered equally by the Lifanyuan, even though only very few Tibetan affairs were treated directly by the Lifanyuan. According to Brunnert and Hagelstrom’s compendium, first published in 1912, the Lifanyuan was dedicated to the “management of relations with Mongolia, Qinghai and the Mohammedan Princedoms in Western China, when it was established in the 17th century”[[5]](#footnote-5), consequently with the exclusion of Tibet. According to both, Tibetan affairs became part of the Lifanyuan only in 1906. Elsewhere they note, however, the incorporation of parts of Khams into the Chinese provinces and the establishment of an Amban in Tibet as of 1727. They add that this agent was under the direction of the Lifanyuan and was authorized to report directly to the Emperor.[[6]](#footnote-6) Likewise, Charles Hucker stresses that the Lifanyuan was “a top-echelon agency in the central government managing relations with Mongolia, Tibet, Qinghai, and tribal chiefs of Eastern Turkestan”.[[7]](#footnote-7) Joseph Fletcher argues in the same direction stating that the “superintendence of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, all Ch’ing Inner Asian tributaries coming to the Ch’ing capital, and of relations with the other Inner Asian polities that lay outside the imperial boundaries, was the responsibility of the Li-fan Yüan”.[[8]](#footnote-8) Evelyn Rawski specifies that “lamaist affairs were supervised by a subagency of the Lifanyuan”[[9]](#footnote-9) and Pamela Crossley informs us that, “because of its special connection with Mongolia, the Lifanyuan handled all communications with Russia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and all administrative affairs of the Tibetan religious leaders”.[[10]](#footnote-10) Finally, for Edward Rhoads, “the Court of Colonial Affairs (Lifanyuan) was responsible for dealing with the Mongols, Turks, and Tibetans living in the outlying realms of the Qing Empire” and, even more explicitly: “the Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans were subject to the Court of Colonial Affairs”.[[11]](#footnote-11) Hence, with the exception of Rawski, who claims that ‘lamaist affairs’ were managed by the Lifanyuan, but who did not mention who was responsible for the administrative affairs, Western authors agree that the Lifanyuan was the sole institution responsible for managing Tibetan affairs inside the Qing empire.

Chinese secondary sources express two points of view. First, Mongolian, Tibetan and Muslims affairs were managed by the Lifanyuan from the mid-seventeenth century to the end of the Qing dynasty. And second, the Lifanyuan was not even mentioned in the two chapters dedicated to the Qing Tibet policy in *The Short History of Tibet*.[[12]](#footnote-12) But the commonly held Chinese view is that the Lifanyuan was a Qing governmental agency that managed Mongolian, Muslim, Russian and Tibetan affairs.

Recently published Chinese and Tibetan document collections challenge, however, these Western and Chinese opinions. Many administrative documents issued from or sent to the Manchu Ambanin Tibet were published in the Tibetan and Chinese languages. Some Tibetan archival document collections are now available. One of these collections reproduces a selection of documents kept in the archives of Lhasa.[[13]](#footnote-13) From the forty-six Qing documents published here, twenty-five are related to the recognition of the Dalai Lama and the Qing emperor’s exercise of protecting Tibetan Buddhism, especially the *dge-lugs-pa* school; twenty-one documents are related to the administration of Tibet (nomination of Tibetan officials or abbots, taxation, memorandum of 1793, etc.), either from the emperor directly or through the Amban.[[14]](#footnote-14) Among them, three were issued by Tibetans. The only document which quotes the Lifanyuan is related to the selection of a new abbot for the *ra-sgrengs* monastery, dated 1828.[[15]](#footnote-15) The criteria for selecting these documents for publication are not revealed in the volume’s introduction which simply states that “these documents are real testimonies of the social and historical life then in Tibet and prove that Tibet has always been part of China”.[[16]](#footnote-16)

Another volume, entitled *Correspondences received from the Amban in the water-ox year* (1793),is introducedas the collection of memoirs from the Amban received during the year 1793 and is yet unpublished.[[17]](#footnote-17) This volume seems to be a practical way to organize archives: all the correspondence emanating from the Amban and addressed to the Tibetan government in 1793 seems to have been collected (the logic of classification is not obvious because the documents are seldom dated). We don’t know how and when this collection was organized. We are still very ignorant of the way the Tibetans classify their archives. Nor do we know other collections of Ambancorrespondences to the Tibetan government organized in Tibet or in China. And in this volume too, as a matter of fact, the Lifanyuan is not quoted.[[18]](#footnote-18)

We assume, however, that the same documents have been kept in the archives of the Manchu *yamen* in Lhasa. That is, at least, suggested by the discovery of two identical Tibetan documents related to the 1793 “Twenty-nine point Memorandum on the Restoration of Tibet approved by the Emperor” (*Qin ding Zang nei shanhou zhangcheng er shi jiu tiao*). One of these is preserved in the volume *Correspondences received from the Amban in the water-ox year* (1793) from the Lhasa archives; the other was reproduced in *A Collection of Historical Archives of Tibet* and was supposedly discovered in the archives of the Manchu *yamen* in Lhasa.[[19]](#footnote-19)

The Chinese *Compendium of Archival Documents Concerning Sino-Tibetan Relations since the Yuan Dynasty*, compiled in seven volumes, is also of interest.[[20]](#footnote-20) The volumes two to five are related to the Qing dynasty. Being published from Chinese sources, this edition obviously has to be approached with caution. We are not sure whether this document collection can claim completion. We also do not know what the reasons initially were behind their coming into being nor the selection criteria for their later publication. What seems obvious is the desire to gather archives documents related to Tibet into a sole collection, documents which were originally dispatched to the archives of various administrative bodies of the Qing government. The necessity felt to gather sources related to Tibet into one or several collections today reveals that Tibet was not considered to be in need of special treatment in the Qing past, but rather recognized as one of the many affairs that the empire had to deal with. In this collection, it seems that no documents were issued by the Lifanyuan at all and that most of them are related to the “Grand Council”. The same reservations and remarks have to be addressed to the *Collection of archive documents related to Tibetan affairs and Tibet preserved in the Number One Archives in Beijing*.[[21]](#footnote-21) Here, the Lifanyuan is present, but only at the very end of the volume and with a very small number of documents dating from 1875 to 1911.

Evidently, a fundamental question arises: who and which Qing administrative agencies did actually manage the Tibetan affairs. According to all secondary sources, it is obvious that the Lifanyuan was responsible, but to what extent. When we look at the published and unpublished archive documents, it becomes clear that other parts of the government were also involved in running Tibetan affairs, along with the Lifanyuan. In fact, both perspectives are legitimate and reveal the complexity of the empire the Qing had to govern. One has, of course, to admit that very few Lifanyuan documents still exist because many archives were destroyed by fire at the end of the Qing dynasty.

A main source that gives an idea about the Lifanyuan’s involvement with Tibetan affairs is the *Imperially commissioned collected regulations of the Qing dynasty* (in the following quoted as *Collected Statutes*) and the accompanying *Imperially commissioned collected regulations and precedents of the Qing dynasty*.[[22]](#footnote-22) These collections were compiled in order to preserve the regulations passed from the imperial centre to local authorities during the Qing dynasty and thus to ease local officials’ governance duties, independently from the exchange of correspondence and arguments around the decisions and regulations. A first conclusion hence would be to characterize the Lifanyuan not as a decision-making body but rather as a final regulations keeper, that is to say: an archive office dedicated to Mongolian, Muslim, Russian and Tibetan affairs. Following this assumption, we find a compilation of regulations which passed between the *yamen* and the six ministers and the Lifanyuan from 1636 to 1899.[[23]](#footnote-23) The Tibetan affairs mentioned within the Lifanyuan part begin in 1654, when Emperor Shunzhi bestowed a title and a tablet to the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso and to Güüshi Khan (Törö-Baikhu, 1582-1655) and ends in 1884 granting the title of Nominkhan to the monk Blo-bzang Don-drub.[[24]](#footnote-24)

**Lifanyuan Archives, Imperial Agencies in Charge of Tibetan Affairs, and the Problem of Communication**

The role of the Lifanyuan archives is also disputable. As is well known, the Lifanyuan established two archive offices in Beijing, one for documents written in Manchu, the other for those in Chinese. The Manchu archive was managed by one Manchu and three Mongols while the Chinese archive was run by a Manchu, a Chinese military (*han jun* 漢軍) and two Chinese correctors. In general, the Manchu archive director sent two subordinate officials as representatives to the local *yamen* to serve as administrative employee (*siguan* 司官) and secretary (*bitieshi* 筆帖式). In the case of the Lhasa *yamen*,however, and contrary to other *yamen*, the secretary for the Manchu archive was appointed by the Lifanyuan, not by the archive director.[[25]](#footnote-25) These officials had first a two-year term and then a three-year term to serve.[[26]](#footnote-26)

For the Chinese archive office, Manchu and Mongol literati were selected by the “Grand Secretariat” and the Hanlin Academy. They were appointed by the emperor to serve two years in turn. Whether any of them were sent to the *yamen*, because they were skilled in Chinese, is not specified. The correctors had to control the content and orthography of the Chinese language text of the documents which were copied and preserved. However, other offices were likewise responsible for the reception and transmission of documents: the “General Services Office” (*siwuting* 司務廰) composed of two employees (*siwu* 司務), one Manchu and one Mongol, received the correspondences from outside the *yamen*. The “Seal Office” (*Dangyuechu* 當月處), was responsible for copying and transmitting documents to the “Grand Secretariat”.[[27]](#footnote-27)

From a pragmatic and technical point of view, it is obvious that the writing and sending of documents from the field written either in Manchu or in Chinese was not easy and that the work of the secretary appointed by the Lifanyuan was not particularly mentioned. In addition, communication between Lhasa and Beijing remained complicated because of the distance between the two capitals. Although the Qing officials in Tibet were supposed to correspond with Beijing in Manchu, the Chinese language was used when they were incompetent in Manchu. In that case the issue was specified in the report sent to the throne.[[28]](#footnote-28) This is probably the reason why eight officials from the “Chengdu Border Office” (*Chengdu* *zhu fang* 成都駐防) skilled in Manchu (*shu Qing zi ma jia* 書清字馬甲) were appointed for Tibet under Emperor Jiaqing (r. 1796-1820).[[29]](#footnote-29)

These same language obstacles in the conduct of Tibetan and other affairs can be observed for Tibetan and sometimes for foreign languages too. During the Jiaqing reign and after the two Gurkha wars (1788, 1791-1793), for example, two officials skilled in the Gurkha language, written and oral, were appointed at the Lhasa *yamen*.[[30]](#footnote-30) But there is no mention at all of a Manchu or a Mongol (or a Tibetan) official or secretary able to speak Tibetan appointed to Lhasa. In Beijing, since 1658, every banner had to appoint three men to learn the Tibetan language, the teachers of which received a salary of a sixth rank official.[[31]](#footnote-31) Later, under Emperor Qianlong (1741), this informal structure became the “Office Dedicated to the Study of Tibetan” (*Tanggute xue si* 唐古忒學司). It was composed of one assistant teacher and four Mongolian secretaries.[[32]](#footnote-32) The office was reinforced with more members in 1839 by Emperor Daoguang (r. 1821-1850) and was supposed to enrol twenty-four students for five years. A final examination directed by the Dalai Lama concluded their studies.[[33]](#footnote-33) The assistant teacher was not only in charge of teaching but also of translating orders of the emperor to the Dalai Lama.[[34]](#footnote-34) It seems likely that those students were not trained to be later sent to Tibet, but were educated to serve as interpreter for Tibetan tribute missions that arrived at Beijing.

Against this background, it is difficult to say whether officials appointed for Tibet spoke, read or wrote Tibetan. Hence, the way Qing and Tibetan officials communicated in Tibet remains uncertain. Among the Ambans or military officials based in Lhasa some were able to communicate with the Tibetan authorities. This was the case with at least two of them. During the first Gurkha war (1788), Amban Bazhong (巴忠) was accused of having badly served the Qing Empire because he was able to speak Tibetan and to communicate with the Tibetan authorities directly. He was said to have been influenced by the Tibetan ministers.[[35]](#footnote-35) After the second Gurkha war (1791-1793), during the negotiations and compilation of the “Twenty-nine point Memorandum on the Restoration of Tibet approved by the Emperor”, General Fukang’an (福康安, †1796), the head negotiator, did not know any Tibetan. Although no information of Sun Shiyi’s (孫士毅, \*1720 †1796) Tibetan language capabilities is given, who was responsible at that time for resupplying Manchu troops in Tibet, it was he who accompanied General Fukang’an to meet the Dalai Lama, so he probably spoke Tibetan.[[36]](#footnote-36) Likewise, Amban Ehui (鄂輝) was able to translate documents written in Tibetan.[[37]](#footnote-37)

How the Tibetan government communicated with the Qing court is another unresolved question. Did Tibetan officials, for instance, participate in the negotiations on the establishment of Qing regulations for Tibet in 1750 and 1793 or did they get involved only after the final Qing document was translated into Tibetan? With regard to the 1750 regulations, there was, in fact, no difference between the draft, discussed with many Tibetan governmental representatives and the three *dge-lugs-pa* monasteries (dGa’ ldan, Sera and ’Bras spungs), and its final version.[[38]](#footnote-38) Regarding the 1793 regulations, it seems that no real negotiations took place between Qing officials in Tibet and the members of the Tibetan government, although the former mentioned to have discussed the matter with the Dalai Lama previously to the composition of the final document.[[39]](#footnote-39) Thus, according to Chinese sources, General Fukang’an reported to Emperor Qianlong formally on 29th November 1792 that the Dalai Lama was consulted during the elaboration of the twenty nine articles document, the first paragraph of which presents the new rules to be followed for the selection of reincarnated masters which stipulated a drawing of lots in a golden urn as the final stage for the recognition of these masters, and that he approved it on 16th October 1792. However, according to other Chinese sources, it is clear that the golden urn destined for the Jo-khang Temple in Lhasa left Beijing before ‘this consultation’ on September 10th and arrived in Lhasa on November 20th the same year.[[40]](#footnote-40) We thus may rightly doubt that the Dalai Lama was informed before the decision was taken in Beijing.

Moreover, the Tibetan translations from the Manchu and Chinese languages of the Qing regulations for Tibet, which were essential to making the Tibetans know what the new rules were all about, were done in Tibet. Some questions, however, regarding the translation work remain vague. Who were the translators and were their translations, sent from Lhasa to Beijing, revised and approved by the emperor? Or is it possible that the dispatched Qing or Mongol officials were authorized to implement a Tibetan version of the imperial regulations? If so, who then were the censors of these translations done in Tibet – translators trained at the Lifanyuan Tibetan School? What can, ultimately, be said about the value of a Qing regulation for Tibet if the final Tibetan version was not revised in Beijing and approved by the emperor?

**The Incorporation of Tibetan Affairs into the Lifanyuan Administration**

At this point of our analysis, the Lifanyuan resembles rather a kind of mediator between the periphery and the centre, being in charge of keeping the archive documents exchanged between the two sides, than a powerful independent executive agency. While being responsible for the appointment of a secretary supervising the Manchu archive within the Lhasa *yamen*, no Tibetan ever became a member of the Lifanyuan. The sphere of competence and political activities of the Lifanyuan regarding Tibetan affairs thus remain obscure. Tibet as a country was not mentioned in the Kangxi and Yongzheng editions of the *Collected Statutes*, whereas the person of the 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso was recognized in 1652 when he came to Beijing to meet Emperor Shunzhi. So far, Lifanyuan duties were devoted mainly to the management of the Mongols.

However, the scope of the Lifanyuan as mentioned in the *Collected Statutes* obviously developed according to the conquest and control exercised by the Qing on the periphery of their empire. The Kangxi and Yongzheng editions insist on the fact that since the Mongolian territory had been conquered, its people were subjected to the Qing Empire and especially to the Lifanyuan.[[41]](#footnote-41) But it is only with the Qianlong edition of the *Collected Statutes* that the scope from Mongolia to the more precise Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Muslims and *Fanseng* (番僧) was enlarged.[[42]](#footnote-42) Here *fan* refers to Tibetans. Indeed, in the introductory part of the Qianlong edition for the “Outer Mongolian Bureau”, Tibet and Qinghai are mentioned as having “entered the map” of the Qing Empire (*ru ban tu* 入版圖).[[43]](#footnote-43)

Consequently, with Qianlong, Tibet entered the structures of the Lifanyuan significantly stronger than before. Its affairs were now incorporated mainly in the long existing “Outer Mongolian Bureau”, though a smaller part was delegated to the “Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau”. The Lifanyuan acquired its definitive structure after the conquest of Kashgar (1762) comprising now six offices, four of which were, however, still dedicated to the Mongols: The “Outer Mongolian Bureau” (*dianshu si* 典屬司), the “Inner Mongolian Bureau” (*qiji si* 旗籍司)*,* the “Outer Mongolian Reception Bureau” (*rouyuan si* 柔遠司), the “Inner Mongolian Reception Bureau” (*wanghui si* 王會司)*,* the “Eastern Turkestan Bureau (*laiyuan si* 來遠司) responsible for Xinjiang, and the “Judicial Bureau” (*lixing si* 理刑司).[[44]](#footnote-44) Although neither of them was particularly dedicated to Tibetan affairs, from the *Collected Statutes* we know that the Lifanyuan regulations addressed three important Tibet-related aspects: the tribute of the high Tibetan masters to the Qing court, the religious affairs administered by the Qing Court and both Manchu and Tibetan administrative and military organization in Tibet.

The official Qing translation for the Lifanyuan in Tibetan was “Department for the Governance of Outer Mongolia” (*phyi’i sog po’i khrims grwa*). The designation referred to the sub-office of the Lifanyuan responsible for Tibetan affairs, which, in fact, was primarily and mainly devoted to the management of Outer Mongolia. Apparently, no literal Tibetan translation for the term ‘Lifanyuan’ exists.

**The Tribute of the High Tibetan Masters to the Qing Court**

As Chia Ning has demonstrated, three central Qing rituals were executed in Inner Asia: the pilgrimage to the emperor (*chaojin* 朝覲), the imperial hunt (*weilie* 圍獵) and the tribute (*chaogong* 朝貢). However, only Mongol rulers who received titles from the emperor, Zunghars from Northern Xinjiang included, were assigned to all of these rituals. Tibetans were not obliged to exercise the pilgrimage to the emperor[[45]](#footnote-45) or the imperial hunt.[[46]](#footnote-46) But, Mongols, Muslims and Tibetans offered tribute to the Qing. The tribute from Mongols and Muslims were due by those who had been granted titles from the emperor.

Regarding Tibet, the tribute “was offered by the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama in rotation. The two top lamas were not required to come to the capital themselves, but to send a tribute mission from one of them at the end of each year.”[[47]](#footnote-47) Although the Qing paid special respect to these missions by sending Lifanyuan officials “to welcome the mission at Xining” in Qinghai province and “accompanied them all the way to the capital, arranged their living accommodations in the West Yellow Temple, and managed the actual process of the tribute ceremony”[[48]](#footnote-48), since 1694 their size was controlled and regulated upon arrival in Xining and should not change to Beijing .[[49]](#footnote-49) In general, the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama had to send tribute to the Qing court in turn on the occasion of ‘celebrations’ (*qingzhu* 慶祝).[[50]](#footnote-50) Their tribute missions were required to be composed of high officials and to convey particular goods to the Chinese capital.[[51]](#footnote-51) After the conquest of Jinchuan (part of Khams), Tibetan *tusi* from Sichuan province were also subjected to the tribute.[[52]](#footnote-52)

Although these tribute missions had an obvious commercial aim, the Inner Asian leaders also looked to get an imperial recognition of their status and position while the Qing court expressed its supremacy in this way. From another perspective, these missions also show a religious content. It seems clear that the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama were required to come to Beijing as heads of the two Qing defined regions: Inner and Outer Tibet. However, the vocabulary used to qualify these missions is arguable. Were the Tibetans obliged to send missions to the capital for ‘celebrations’ (*qingzhu*) or as a manifestation of their submission (*ru gong* 入貢)? The mission was delegated from Tibet’s clerical hierarchy’s highest masters and the religious objects offered to the emperor make us believe that these missions’ intentions were religious first and political second. They corresponded to the interpersonal relationship of a typical chaplain-donor relation. As a matter of fact, Lifanyuan was concerned with the organization of these missions.

**Tibetan Religious Affairs Administered by the Qing Court**

Since Qianlong, the reincarnated masters and monks from Tibet and Inner as well as Outer Mongolia were classified, numbered, registered, and called ‘Lamas’: the Lamas living in Beijing (*zhu Jing lama* 駐京喇嘛) who worked in the ‘Office of the Seals’[[53]](#footnote-53), the Lamas from abroad (*Fan lama* 番喇嘛) who were from Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan,[[54]](#footnote-54) and the wandering Lamas (*Youmu lama* 游牧喇嘛) from Outer Mongolia and Tibet.[[55]](#footnote-55) Every category had its reincarnated masters who were duly registered and could receive specified titles and seals.[[56]](#footnote-56)

Yet another important regulation concerning the recognition of the Tibetan reincarnated masters was implemented by Qianlong in 1793. The motives of the emperor were obviously to avoid the corruption of the oracles and to protect the *dge-lugs-pa* against a possible takeover of coming reincarnation lineages and their seizure, and thus to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of only one or a few Tibetan families. For this reason Qianlong added a final stage (the drawing of lots) to various Tibetan traditional rituals which he refused to modify or to exclude. He thus exercised his role as protector of the *dge-lugs-pa* by protecting the religious and esoteric part of the successive rituals and institutionalised the last test by imposing the presence of his representative in Lhasa during the drawing of lots.[[57]](#footnote-57)

The Lifanyuan was commissioned to register the reincarnated masters and the lay people who would like to be ordained.[[58]](#footnote-58) It was also in charge of controlling the movement of this clergy.[[59]](#footnote-59) But its main role was to act as an intermediary between periphery and Court. The Lifanyuan had thus, for example, to check inquiries and demands with existing local traditions. When the new Jibzundamba (rJe-btsun-dam-pa) requested permission to go to Beijing to receive a seal and a tablet, the Court asked the Lifanyuan to check the conformity of such a demand with tradition.[[60]](#footnote-60) It also transmitted new orders from the Court to the local *yamen*. Again, in the case of the Jibzundamba Khutugtu, as soon as his reincarnation became known, the Lifanyuan was to be informed and had to convey the news to the *yamen*.[[61]](#footnote-61) These duties were extended to the Tibetan monks living in the Shaanxi province.[[62]](#footnote-62) Moreover, an official from the Lifanyuan was in charge of the ‘drawings of lots’ that should be done in the Temple of the Lamas (*Yonghegong* 永和宮) in Beijing jointly with the ‘Jasak Lama Keeper of the Seals’.

**Qing Agencies and Officials in Tibet**

Surprisingly but as a matter of fact, the *Collected Statutes* make no mention of the Qing officials and militaries based in Tibet or of the Tibetan administrative and military organizations. The way the Lifanyuan was involved in these structures is not specified. But, the official career of the Ambans can be examined in order to determine whether they were part of the Lifanyuan at some point in their career.

Qing officials of the Lhasa *yamen* were composed of two Ambans, one or two secretaries, and one administrative employee. As we have seen before, only one of the secretaries, responsible for the Manchu language archive, was appointed by the Lifanyuan. The other officials, and especially the most important, the Ambans, were selected by the emperor or the “Board of Appointments” through the “Grand Secretariat” or the “Grand Council”. However, some careers reveal a certain link between the Lifanyuan and the Ambans.[[63]](#footnote-63) Thus, from the 173 Ambans and vice Ambans, eighteen were members of the Lifanyuan. Among them, only one Amban became Lifanyuan vice minister (*shilang* 侍郎) at the same time.[[64]](#footnote-64) Two were first Lifanyuan vice minister and later Amban.[[65]](#footnote-65) Three were at first Amban and later during their term became vice minister.[[66]](#footnote-66) In the long term of their careers, five were at first Amban and later became Lifanyuan vice ministers.[[67]](#footnote-67) Only one occupied first the post of a vice minister before he was appointed Amban.[[68]](#footnote-68) Some Ambans occupied other posts within the Lifanyuan, for instance as bureau director (*liangzhong* 郎中),[[69]](#footnote-69) others became high officials: Dachen.[[70]](#footnote-70) Among these eighteen officials, twelve were imperial commissioners and six vice imperial commissioners.

These figures show that a large portion of the Ambans (15 of 18) was later promoted member of the Lifanyuan.[[71]](#footnote-71) In return, only a few (3 of 18) became one after having been member of the Lifanyuan.[[72]](#footnote-72)

This state of affairs is corroborated by an archive correspondence between General Fukang’an and the “Grand Secretariat” regarding the criteria for the selection of a new Amban for Tibet in 1792: After various considerations concerning officials in reserve and without seeking advice from the Lifanyuan, Fukang’an made reference to Shulian (舒濂) “who administers the affairs meticulously and understands the country’s tribute situation”[[73]](#footnote-73). But Shulian died as soon as he arrived in Tibet. Fukang’an then proposed Kuilin who had been Amban before. In his favour, Kuilin showed experience in the restoration of the Taiwan Island conducted jointly with Fukang’an. In his disfavour, Kuilin was not a Buddhist. Therefore, Fu Kang’an decided to temporarily appoint Eldemboo, who later became Dachen in the Lifanyuan, and finally confirmed Ehui. However, as Ehui showed himself weak (*xuruo* 賉弱) and Chengde not tidy enough (*culu* 粗率), Helin (和琳, †September 1796), recognized as meticulous (*xixin* 細心), was appointed Amban jointly with Ehui.[[74]](#footnote-74) The nomination of Helin corresponded to the imperial expectations that the Amban was not only diligent (*jinchi* 謹飭) with mediocre intelligence (*zhongcai* 中才), but a high official of the empire (*da yuan* 大員).[[75]](#footnote-75) Although this appointment marked the beginning of the Qing restoration programme for Tibet in July – August 1792 (to be finished in April – May 1793) and reflected Emperor Qianlong’s desire to exercise more control over the Tibetan administration, personal links between officials, their personalities and experience in the border management seemed to be the decisive nomination criteria rather than any affiliation with the Lifanyuan.[[76]](#footnote-76)

However, Lifanyuan officials were not totally absent from the Tibetan political arena. Some were sent to Tibet for short missions, together with governmental officials. The 5th Dalai Lama Ngawang Lobsang Gyatso, for example, while on his way back to Tibet received his seal from the ministers of the Lifanyuan (Dudali 度達禮) and the “Board of Ceremonies” (Jueluo langqiu 覺羅朗球) in 1653.[[77]](#footnote-77) And when Sanggye Gyatsho (Sangs rgyas Gya mtsho) concealed the death of the 5th Dalai Lama in 1682, the emperor sent an executive member of the Lifanyuan (*zhu shi Baozhu* 主事保住) to Tibet to check the matter.[[78]](#footnote-78) Again, a Bureau Director of the Lifanyuan (Elai 鄂賴) was sent to Tibet in 1723.[[79]](#footnote-79)

**Conclusions**

The Lifanyuan provided an institutional link between the imperial centre and the periphery of Inner Asia. For Qing officials it played an essential role in governing Tibetan affairs. The preservation of every final, Tibet-related decision in its archives underlines the Lifanyuan’s administrative reference and importance for Beijing. But, the Lifanyuan was not a decision-making agency for Tibetan affairs. In order to fulfil its archival functions, the Lifanyuan was responsible for the appointment of a secretary to be in charge of the Manchu archive in the Lhasa *yamen* of Tibet. However, the Lifanyuan duties did not include the selection and nomination of Ambans. Very few from these active Qing Ambans based in Tibet came from the Lifanyuan or had started a career there before. All of them were ethnic Manchus or Mongols, none of them was Tibetan.

Aside from these administrative and military aspects, the Lifanyuan was, however, competent for the ritual dimension in the relation between the Tibetan masters, both the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, and the Qing Emperors. The religious life of Tibet, especially the recognition of the Tibetan master’s reincarnations, the ordination of monks and the administration of some monasteries through offerings, as well as the remuneration given to Tibetan officials and monks in Beijing, was organized through and administered by the Lifanyuan, some rituals even jointly with the “Ministry of Rites” (Libu).

The way the Qing governed Tibet finally offers an image of the Manchu understanding of and the administrative adaptation to the Tibetan dual political organization – the secular and the spiritual world. The mundane governance remained with the highest departments of the Qing government and the inner court: the “Grand Secretariat”, the “Grand Council” and the emperor himself. Despite the specific policies defined for Tibet, if compared with Mongolia or Xinjiang, Tibet was controlled like any other part of the empire. The Qing spiritual administration for Tibet was more complex. The Lifanyuan exercised a large part of it and Emperor Qianlong, thanks to the Master Court and the advisor Changkya Khutugtu (lcang-skya ho-thog-thu) Rolpai Dorje (\*1717 †1786), was involved himself. From a Tibetan point of view, the Lifanyuan did not exist as an institutional administrative structure. The Tibetan court’s interlocutor was the emperor, no one else. As such, the ‘*chaplain-donor relationship*’ was plainly vivid. Qing agents in Tibet were seen as representatives of the emperor and were mere observers. Anyway, both party searched for its own benefits. The Tibetans benefited from the protection of the imperial army and from the Qing emperors’ recognition of the high Buddhist masters granting them a high status within the empire, while the Qing succeeded to maintain Tibet under their control to achieve peace with the Mongols without much expenditure. It seems in no way excessive to add that the relations between the Dalai Lamas and the Qing emperors also resembled that of a ‘*bodhisattva-to-bodhisattva relationship*’ and that the administrative structure surrounding both was unable to corrupt this spiritual Buddhist link.

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1. Beginning with the Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) until the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) the *tusi* system was a way to incorporate local chieftains into the framework of the Peking government administration. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The Dalai Lama rejected a request from the Manchu emperor regarding the transfer of Tibetan and Mongol troops to China; see Sam Van Schaik, *Tibet: A History* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2011), 126. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See, for example, Evelyn S. Rawski, *The Last Emperors: A Social History of Qing Imperial Institutions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Fabienne Jagou, “Étude des toponymes choisis par les Mandchous pour définir le territoire tibétain,” in *Études tibétaines en l’honneur d’Anne Chayet*, ed. Jean-Luc Achard (Paris: École Pratique des Hautes Études, 2010), 127-146. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. H. [Ippolit] S[emenovich] Brunnert and V[iktor] V[ladimirovich] Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China* (Taipei: Ch’eng Wen Publishing Company, 1978), 160, entry 491. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Ibid., 467, entry 906−907. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Charles O. Hucker, *A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985), 304, entry 3603. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Joseph Fletcher, “Ch’ing Inner Asia c. 1800,” in *The Cambridge History of China: Late Ch’ing, 1800-1911*, vol. 10,1, ed. John K. Fairbank (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 37. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Rawski, *Last Emperors*, 254. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen F. Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, “Introduction,” in *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*, ed. Pamela Kyle Crossley et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 22, footnote 18. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
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12. *Qing chao zhi Zang dian zhang yanjiu* (Peking: Zhongguo Zang xue chubanshe, 2002), 250. *Zang zu jianshi bian xie* (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1985). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. *Bod kyi lo rgyus yig tshags gces bsdus* (Peking: Wenwu, 1995). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Four of these 21 documents concern economic reforms implemented by the Qing government between 1891 and 1907; Ibid., document number 48 and 68-70. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Ibid., document number 60 from Amban Huixian 惠顯 to the regent. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid., see the Chinese, Tibetan and English prefaces without pagination. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. *Chu glang wang zhu tshur phul gyi deb, Shui niu nian wenshu song lai ben* (Lhasa: Research Centre of the Tibetan Social Sciences Institute, unpublished manuscript, 1983), 4: lines 3−4. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Liao Zugui, Li Yongchang, and Li Pengnian, “‘Qin ding Zang nei shanhou zhangcheng er shi jiu tiao’ banben kaolue,” *Zhongguo Zangxue* 2 (2004): 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
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23. That started with the *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690) until the end of the *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899). [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690), juan 144, 1b. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 24a. Kungang, high Lifanyuan official (*Dachen* 大臣) from 1884 to 1886, contributed to the Guangxu edition. He was the only official from the Lifanyuan who participated in this enterprise. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 49, 14a−b, 15a. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. *Da Qing huidian zeli* (Qianlong edition, 1767), juan 142, 30a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 977, 20a. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 49, 14a−b, 15a. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. On the use of the Manchu language regarding Inner Asian matters and military affairs, see Pamela Kyle Crossley and Evelyn Sakakida Rawski, “A Profile of the Manchu Language in Ch’ing History,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 53, no. 1 (1993): 63-78; Evelyn. S. Rawski, “Qing Publishing in Non-Han Languages,” in *Printing and Book Culture in Late Imperial China*, ed. Cynthia J. Brokaw et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 304. For examples, see *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, documents 847, 869, and 886. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 27a. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 67, 9a. On the importance of the Sichuan military and administrative authorities in the Manchu management of Tibetan affairs, see Dai Yingcong, *The Sichuan Frontier and Tibet: Imperial Strategy in the Early Qing* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
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31. *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690), juan 144, 1b. *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng edition, 1732), juan 222, 1b. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 79, 1b. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 992, 15a. [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Ibid., juan 992, 14b. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi,* document892, for a report of general Fukang’an from the 14th February 1792. [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. As a matter of fact, Sun Shiyi participated in the elaboration of the dictionary entitled “Five Languages of the Western Areas” (Qinding Xiyu tongwen zhi 欽定西域同文志) as a corrector. [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi,* document900, 22nd March 1792, for Fukang’an’s report which specifies that Ehui translated a letter from rDo-ring Pandita to the Dalai Lama. Ehui was Amban from the 5th December 1791 to the 4th December 1792. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. *Qing chao zhi Zang dian zhang yanjiu*, vol. 1, 34-45. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Fabienne Jagou, “The Use of the Ritual Drawing of Lots for the Selection of the 11th Panchen Lama,” in *Revisiting Rituals in a Changing Tibetan World: Proceedings of the Seminar “La transformation des rituels dans l’aire tibétaine à l’époque contemporaine” held in Paris on 8th and 9th November 2007*, ed. Katia Buffetrille et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 53-60. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, for the Order of Qianlong to the Grand Council on the 26th September 1792 and the report from Fukang’an to Qianlong from 12th January 1793. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi edition, 1690), juan 142, 1a. *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng edition, 1732), juan 221, 1a. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan79, 2a. Some scholars understand *fan* as Tibetans, which is occasionally the case, but sometimes the notion refers only to the Tibetans living on the border of China’s inner territory (i.e. the territory the Qing inherited from their Ming predecessors). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Ibid., juan 80, 1a. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. Nicola Di Cosmo, “Qing Colonial Administration in Inner Asia,” *The International History Review* 20, no. 2 (1998): 295. The Kangxi and Yongzheng *Collected Statutes* do not follow the same organization, as the Lifanyuan acquired its definitive structure under Qianlong until Emperor Guangxu when it changed again. [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Chia Ning, “The Li-Fan Yuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644-1795),” *Late Imperial China* 14, no. 1 (1993): 64. [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. For the imperial hunt at Mulan, see also Mark C. Elliott and Chia Ning, “The Qing Hunt at Mulan,” in *New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde*, ed. James Millward et al. (London: Routledge, 2004), 70-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Chia Ning, “Inner Asian Rituals,” 71. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid.; about the products exchanged between Tibetans and the Qing, ibid. 72. The Lifanyuan office responsible for the welcome to the capital was the “Outer Mongolian Bureau”. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng edition, 1732), juan 222, 8b. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 80, 9a-b, 10a. [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Ibid., juan 80, 9a−b. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 30b. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 67, 12b-13b. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 68, 7a. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 80, 8b. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 25a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 2a-7b. The Qing established a hierarchy inside the ‘Office of the Seals’ (*lama yinwu chu*), the highest of which was called ‘Jasak Lama Keeper of the Seals’ (*zhang yin zhasake da lama* 章印札薩克喇嘛). He was aided by a ‘Vice Jasak Lama Keeper of the Seals’ (*fu zhang yin Jasak da lama*), four ‘Jasak Lamas’, eight to ten ‘Da Lamas’, seven ‘Vice Lamas’, and ten lamas occasionally. Their disciples were called Gelong and Bandi. Some masters and monks, coming from the Chengde, Duolun, Wutaishan monasteries or others from Sichuan, were part of the Lamas living in Beijing. Some of these reincarnated masters like lCang skya Qutuqtu, Minzhu’er Qutuqtu or Jilong Qutuqtu, either taught Tibetan Buddhism in China or went to Tibet on special occasions. They alternately became abbots of the Yonghe gong in Peking. All Lamas living in Beijing received a salary from the Qing court, cf. *Da Qing huidian* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 68, 1b-2a. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 26a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 975, 1a-9a. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 26a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 7b-24a. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. *Da Qing huidian* (Qianlong edition, 1748), juan 80, 8b. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. *Da Qing huidian* (Jiaqing edition, 1818), juan 52, 26a-27a. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 975, 9a-13b. See *Bod kyi lo rgyus yig tshags gces bsdus*, document number 50, for the first article of Qianlong’s Tibetan edict from 1793. [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu edition, 1899), juan 974, 7a, 8a-b; juan 975, 1a. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. The monks had, for example, to ask for a certificate if they wanted to go to Mongolia and in that case the Lifanyuan actor in the field was the military governor; Ibid., juan 974, 21a-b. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Ibid., juan 974, 13a. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Ibid., juan 974, 22a. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Ibid., juan 975, 7a. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Wu Feng pei and Ceng Guoqing, *Qing chao zhu Zang dachen zhidu de jianli yu yange* (Beijing: Zhongguo Zangxue chubanshe, 1989), 111-170. *Qing dai zhiguan nianbiao*, (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2005), vol.1-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Baotai (保泰) was vice minister (1780) and vice Amban (6.3. 1780 – 16.3. 1783). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Bazhong (巴忠) was vice minister (1785-1791) and Amban (30.12.1788 – 21.1.1789). Boqing’e (博清額) was Lifanyuan vice minister (1777-1779), Lifanyuan high official (1780-1785) and Amban (4.12.1780 – 9.1.1785). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Huixian (惠顯) was vice minister (1829-1831) and Amban (23.4.1827 – 8.9.1830). Funai (輔鼐) was vice minister (1763-1767) and Amban (27.2.1761 – 7.3.1764). Yuning (玉寧) was vice minister (1806-1809) and Amban (3.12.1805 – 30.11.1808). [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Pufu (普福) was vice minister (1790, 1798-1800) and vice Amban (21.1.1789 – 30.6.1790, 30.6. – 10.8.1790). Hening (和甯) was vice minister (1801, 1804-1806) and vice Amban (7.12.1793 – January 1800). Hutili (瑚圖禮) was vice minister (1813) and Amban (15.12.1811 – 2.10.1813). Songyun (松筠) was vice minister (1832-1833) and Amban (14.8.1794 – 25.2.1799). Longwen (隆文) was vice minister (1834-1836) and Amban (3.12.1830 – 26.2.1833). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Qinghui (慶惠) was vice minister for one year in 1808 and vice Amban (26.2.1811 – 28.4.1812). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Wen Kang (文康) was vice Amban (20.5. – 2.8.1846). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Sengge (僧格) was Dachen (1733-1738) and Amban (20.2.1727 – 19.2.1733). Boqing’e was Dachen (1780-1785) and Amban (4.12.1780 – 9.1.1785). Liu Baozhu (劉保柱) was Dachen (1785-1796) and Amban (28.10.1775 – 3.3.1779, 9.1.1785 – 10.10.1786). Kuilin (奎林) was Dachen (1776-1780) and Amban (17.10. – 5.12.1791). Eldemboo (Eledengbao (額爾登保, \*1748 †1805) was Dachen (1801-1802) and vice Amban (8.2. – 17.12.1792). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Kuilin, Qinghui, Wenkang, Pufu, Hening, Hutili, Songyun, Longwen, Huixian, Funai, Yuning, Sengge, Liu Baozhu and Eldemboo (Boqing’e enters both categories). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Baotai, Bazhong and Boqing’e. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. See *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 894, for the memorial of Fukang’an to the Dalai Lama, 18th February 1792. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Ibid., document 903, order of the “Grand Secretariat”, 22nd March 1792. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. Jagou, Fabienne, “Manzhou jiangjun Fu Kang’an: 1792 zhi 1793 nian Xizang zhengwu gaige de xianqu,” in *Bianchen yu jiangli*,ed. Paola Calanca et al. (Peking: Zhonghua shuju: 2007), 147-167. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Zahiruddin Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (Rome: Ismeo, 1970), 184. *Da Qing shilu* (Lhasa: Xizang renmin chubanshe, 1982), Shunzhi, 18th May 1653. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Ahmad, *Sino-Tibetan Relations*, 305. *Da Qing shilu*, Kangxi, 28th February 1697. *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 552, 13th June 1696. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Luciano Petech, *China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century: History of the Establishment of Chinese Protectorate in Tibet* (Leiden: Brill, 1950), 74. *Yuan yilai Xizang difang yu Zhongyang zhengfu guanxi*, document 610, order from the emperor, 20th March 1723. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)